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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
INDUSTRIAL COMM I SS ION OF UTAH; 
JOHN I. JOHNSON; and AUSTIN C. 
NOLI SA, 
Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
H~TRODGCTICN 
Case No. 16655 
This action was filed with the Utah Supreme Court 
seeking judicial review and reversal of the decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which 
allowed two claimants, John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa, to 
receive unemployment compensation from December 19, 1978 to 
January 27, 1979. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. filed its brief on 
October 26, 1979 and the brief of the defendant was filed on 
November 21, 1979. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW. 
The defendant Industrial Commission suggests that the 
Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision of the Board of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Review in the instant case, should merely affix its rubber 
stamp of approval and affirm the decision. The purpose of 
providing judicial review, however, is to determine whether 
decisions made by the Industrial Commission are proper and 
supported by substantial evidence, and the process is not as 
automatic as the defendant assumes. 
In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission, 
the Supreme Court is required to review the record below. 
Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Securit:Y, 
25 Utah 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587, 588 (1970); Denby v. Board of 
Review of Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 
1977). Furthermore, the Court is not bound by conclusions of 
the Board of Review and will not substitute missing findings in 
order to corrobrate a decision of the Industrial Commission 
which is not supported by the record. Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 
Utah 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 46 (1966). 
That decisions of the Industrial Commission are not 
automatically affirmed was recognized in Peterson v. Industrial 
Commission, 102 Utah 175, 129 P.2d 563, at 564 (1942), where 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
But to sustain the conclusion of the Commission 
the evidence must be substantial evidence, competent 
evidence, evidence upon which a reasonable mind, a 
judicious mind, may be content to rest its judgment. 
In the instant case, the decision of the Board of Review 
awardi_ng unemployment benefits to the claimants (reversing the 
· ther decision of the Appeal Referee) was not supported by el 
t h decision substantial or competent evidence and consequently e 
of the Board Review must be reversed. 
-2-
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II. THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT WAS NOT 
INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE AN EMPLOYEE'S EDUCATION. 
The Industrial Commission does not dispute that 
claimants Johnson and Nolisa terminated their employment and 
returned to school or that a justified reprimand by an employer 
is not a good cause for termination. Nor does the Commission 
assert that the claimants' unsuccessful efforts to be 
reclassified as Plant Services "A" employees constituted a good 
cause for quitting their jobs with Pepperidge Farm, Inc. The 
sole contention of the Commission is that the termination of 
employment by both Johnson and Nolisa was somehow involuntary 
under the circumstances. 
The courts have never held, however, that quitting to 
return to school full time constitutes an "involunatry" 
termination or a tPrminatinn with "good cause." Rather, the 
courts have unanimously agreed that the purpose of the 
unemployment system is not to subsidize an employees education, 
Keisling v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 181 
A.2d 717, 718 (Pa. 1962); Fentersheib v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 124 A. 2d 375, 376 (Pa.1956) 
~es v. Department of Human Resources Development, 32 Cal 
App, 3d 338, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (1973), but "to provide a 
cushion against the shocks and rigors of unemployment." Singer 
~g Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, Department of 
~ment and Unemployment Insurance, 104 Utah 175, 134 P.2d 
479, 485 (1943). 
The declared policy of the Employment Security act is 
"to establish financial reserves for the benefit of persons 
-3-
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unemployed through no fault of their own." Olof N~~ 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 521, 24 3 
P.2d 951, 958 (1952): And one 1·1hose mental attitude is 
inconsistent with a genuine attachment to the labor market or 
who is unavailable for and refuses to accept suitable work for 
personal reasons is not entitled to unemployment compensation. 
Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial C~~mission, 567 P.2d 
626, 629 (Utah 1977); Mills v. Gronning, 581 P. 2d 1334, 1337 
(Utah 1978). As this Court stated in Johnson v. Board of 
Review of Industrial Commission, 7 Utah 2d 113, 320 P.2d 315, 
at 316 (1958): 
••• [T]he purpose of the Employment Security Act, as stated 
by the declaration of policy, is to lt..9:..b_ten the burdens of 
unemEl:.Qyment upon the worker and his family and to maintain 
purchasing power in the economy. The design is to nip in 
the bud the descending economic spiral which may result 
fro!" 11nernr:il0yf'1~nt ana conseq11Prit- loss of ptlrch-'1si.n'] power 
which tends to ramify in chain reaction from throughout the 
economy. It is reasoned, however, that the Act was not 
intended to go beyond that purpose, and that unless it is 
carefully administered, the fund will be kept depleted so 
that it will not be able to fill in the breach and 
stabilize the economy in emergencies as intended. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In the instant case the only compelling circumstance 
requirjng both Johnson and Nolisa to quit their jobs with 
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., on September 23, 1978 was their desire 
and intent to return, full time, to Utah State University for 
Fall Quarter, which began on September 26, 1978, the Tuesday 
following their voluntary termination. 
-4-
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II I. THE CUI IMJ1NTS VOLUNTARILY TERMINATED THEIR 
EMPLOYMENT' W IT!lOU'l' GOOD CAUSE. 
A. Claimants' Failure To Be Reclassified Did 
Not Constitute Cood Cause For Termination 
Section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, disqualifies both claimants from receiving 
unemployment benefits from December 17, 1978 to January 27, 
1979. The Industrial Commission contends that the claimants 
~re justified in quitting their jobs due to their failure to 
be reclassified as Plant Services "A" employees. The record, 
however, is clear that the reclassification applied only to 
those employees working the night-owl shift and that neither 
claimant was working that shift. (R. 00098, 00099). 
Furthermore, the plaintiff, at the request of claimants, 
reviewed the job reclassification on two separate occassions 
ctnd rleterm.ined each time Lhctl: it WctS buti1 proper c111d 11ecess,:u:y 
because of the greater skills, duties, and responsibilities 
required of the Plant Service "A" employees. (R. 00039, 00043 I 
00044). 
The failure of either claimant to obtain 
reclassification did not constitute good cause for voluntarily 
leaving their employment with plaintiff. The claimants chose 
to remain employed for over 16 months after the job 
reclassification occurred. Their responsibilities and wages 
~re the same as all other Plant Service "B" employees, and 
each claimant had at least five (5) separate opportunities to 
bid for the position of Plant Service "A" yet, neither Johnson 
or Nolisa made any effort to do so. (R. 00039, 00044, 00098, 
-5-
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B. The Merits Of The Discrimination 
Complaints Are Not Before The Court 
The Industrial Commission attempts to confuse the 
issues by repeatedly mentioning that claimants had filed 
complaints of discrimination with the Industrial Commission of 
the State of Utah and by pointing out that both Johnson and 
Nolisa "are Black". While the defendant correctly states that 
the merits of those discrimination complaints are not at is~e 
in the current controversy before the Supreme Court, the br~f 
of the Industrial Commission is replete with comments arguing 
the validity of those complaints and ultimately reduces the 
claimants failure to be reclassified as Plant Service "A" 
employees as a "racial grievance." (Defendant's brief at 11). 
The Industrial Commission clouds the issues further by I 
referring the Court to the case of Tavlor v. Unemployment ' 
Compensation Board of Review, 378 A. 2d 829 (Pa. 1977). There, 
the merits of the employees complaints of racial discrimination 
were before the reviewing court and the claimant, unlike the 
current case, had been subjected to racially derogatory 
language and slurs from his employees, co-workers and 
customers, in addition to verbal abuse and racial insults. 
Furthermore, the claimant had been told by his employer that it 
would be too embarrassing if his customers learned that he had 
hired a black employee, so he required the claimant to pick up 
his paycheck in the basement so that none of the white 
customers would see that a black man was employed there. 
There is no evidence or even a claim in the instant 
case that either Johnson or Nolisa were ever subject to racial 
-6-
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insults or verbal abuse while at Pepperidge Farm, Inc. or that 
their employer attempted to conceal their employment from the 
public. On the contrary, Pepperidge Farm, Inc. is an equal 
opportunity employer and has never discriminated against any 
employee because of race or national origin and the fact that 
the claimants are black was not a factor in their job 
classification and did not effect their opportunity for 
advancement. (R. 00039, 00040). Moreover, the merits of the 
discrimination complaints are not currently before the court 
for consideration or review. The sole issue is whether or not 
the claimants are entitled to unemployment compensation, as was 







All right. Now then, concerning this matter 
of the discrimination charge, is there any 
documentation available at this hearing 
concerning that charge and the Industrial 
Commission's decision in the matter? 
Mr. Green, do you have anything on that? 
Excuse me, what I asked you about, Mr. 
Green, was, "What was the decision of the 
Industrial Commission concerning the charge 
of discrimination?" 
It's still, still occurring now, it's not 
completed. Is that right? 
All this is, is a notifiction that a charge 
has been filed. This is not the decision. 
So then, actually, in fact, the case is 
still pending? 
That is correct. 
-7-
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Referee: Now, just a moment, Mr. Nol isa, it is not 
· t t · t d · mv in en ion o eterm1ne the merits of this · 
matter of the, your complaint with the 
company. That's between you and the 
company. What I have to rule on is this 
matter of the allowance of benefits under 
the circumstances. 
Referee: If you are here, supposedly, as 
representative of Mr. Johnson and I will 
listen to your testimony insofar as it is 
relevant to his separation, but I am not 
going to consider the entire issue of 
discrimination as it occurred between these 
gentlem2n and the Pepperidge Farms. That is 
something that has been filed with another 
authority and until that becomes final, I 
would have no decision on it. (R. 00092, 
00093, 00094, 00101). (Emphasis supplied). 
C. Plaintiff Was Not Aware Of The Discrimination 
Complaints At The Time Claimants Were Suspended 
Or Prior To Their Termination 
The Industrial Commission also asserts that the 
claimants were compelled to terminate their employment because 
of acts of discrimination which "intensified after they filed a 
discrimination complaint." Noticeably lacking from the record, 
however, is any evidence supporting the claimants allegations 
that they were assigned dangerous or unusually difficult tasks 
once they had filed discriminaiton complaints with the 
Industrial Commission. Claimant Nolisa maintains that he was, 
on three separate occassions, "directed to enter and clean a 
baking oven while in operation" yet plaintiff's equipment was 
never cleaned during operation, and in fact, it was impossible 
to even open a baking oven while in operation. (R. 00040) · 
The Industrial Commission states that "the evidence of 
record is abundant and convincing that after the claimants 
-8-
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filed their discrimination complaints conditions deteriorated 
to the point the claimants were finally compelled to leave 
work." (Defendant's Brief at 9). Yet, the Industrial 
commission resorts to assumptions in its self-serving 
conclusion that the claimants had filed their discrimination 
complaints before they were suspended on August 29, 1978, a 
conclusion entirely unsupported by the record. The Industrial 
Commission further ignores the record in its statement that the 
claimants were suspended as a result of the discrimination 
complaints they filed. 
On August 28, 1978, before the discrimination 
complants were even filed, claimant Nolisa was determined to be 
insubordiate to his foreman and was suspended for five days 
without pay when he reported to work on the next day. 
(R. 00043). On August 29, 1978 claimant Johnson was also 
~spended for failure to accept direction from his supervisor. 
(R. 00037). 
The Industrial Commission maintains that the claimants 
filed their discrimination complaints in the morning of August 
29, 1978 and were consequently suspended when they reported to 
work that afternoon. Not only did the misconduct of Nolisa 
giving rise to his suspension occur the day before the 
Industrial Commission claims the complaints were even filed, 
but the record establishes, and the attorney for the claimants 
agreed, that the claimants did not file their complaint's 
alleging discrimination until August 31, 1978, two days after 
their suspension by plaintiff. (R. 00062, 00083, 00086, 00100) • 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff did not suspend either claimant in 
retaliation for their complaints since both claimants were 
disciplined before any complaint of discrimination was even 
filed. Contrary to the defendant's "assumption" the record 
establishes that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the 
complaints until September 22, 1978 when the claimants picked 
up their separation slips, and consequently did not, in 
retaliation, force or request either claimant to perform tasks 
which were different, additional or dangerous from their 
ordindary job assignments. (R. 00021, 00091). Notice from th~ 
Industrial Commission of the discrimination complaints was not 
even mailed until August 31, 1978 and then the notice was 
mailed to plaintiff's main office in Connecticut rather than to 
its plant in Smithfield, Utah. (R. 00093, 00093, 00107). 
Moreover, no notice of the complaints was mailed to plaintiff's 
plant in Utah un itl November 1, 1978, long after both claimants 
had quit and returned to school. (R. 00093, 00105). Indeed, 
contrary to the Industrial Commission's "assumptions," there is 
no evidence of any discrimination or that acts of 
discrimination intensified after the claimants filed 
discrimination complaints or that the filing of the complaints 
~as even a factor in their termination. Rather, the only 
"abundant and convincing" evidence is that plaintiff was not 
even aware that either claimant had filed .a complaint alleging 
discrimination either at the time they were suspended or at the 
time the purported acts of discrimination occurred. 
Despite the distorted arguments of the Industrial 
Commission, the evidence of record fails to support a findi~ 
-10-
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that either claimant had good cause for voluntarily terminating 
their employment with plaintiff. The real reason claimants 
Johnson and Nolisa quit their jobs with Pepperidge Farm, Inc. 
was so they could return to school full time. The Industrial 
commission does not even attempt to dispute the following 
evidence: (1) that both claimants informed plaintiff on 
August 29, 1978 that they were quitting to return to school 
(R. 00037, 00042, 00043, 00091); (2) that neither claimant had 
been attending school during the summer of 1978, nor were they 
enrolled at the time they informed plaintiff of their intended 
termination (R. 00092); (3) that both gave notice that they 
intended to quit well in advance of their actual termination 
date (R. 00042, 00043, 00082, 00085, 00091); (4) that the 
claimants terminated their employment on the exact date they 
stated they would (R. 00091, 0009 2) ; ( 5) that the discharge 
slips prepared by plaintiff indicated that both claimants had 
quit to return to school (R. 00091, 00100, 00101); (6) that 
the claims for unemployment benefits submitted by both 
claimants stated only that they had "Quit" (R. 00123, 00124); 
and (7) that both claimants began to attend school at Utah 
State University on a full time basis on September 26, 1978, 
only three days after they had quit. (R. 00092). 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Board of Review is unsupported by 
any substantial evidence of record and the decision of the 
Appeal Referee determining the claimants to be ineligible to 
receive unemployment benefits from December 17, 1978 to 
-11-
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January 27, 1979 and establishing an overpayment of 
compensation to claimants should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this l day of March, 1980. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
ByD~s:/.el w. Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Continental Bank Buildi~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, was mailed via United 
States mail postage fully pre-paid to Floyd Z. Astin & K. Alan 
Zabel, Special Assistants to the Attorney General for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment 
Security, 174 Social Hall Avenue Salt Lake City, Utah 84147a 
to Michael E. Bolson, Attorney for Claimants, Utah Legal 
Services, Inc., 385-24th Street, Suite 522, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
on this day of March, 1980. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
By~~~~~,,--=.--~~~~-. 
Daniel w. Anderson 
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